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"Free Press-Fair Trial" Revisited:
Defendant-Centered Remedies
as a Publicity Policy
There is widespread concern that extensive crime reporting in the mass
media threatens the right of an accused to a fair trial by influencing the
behavior of judges and juries. Several kinds of crime coverage may have
this effect: the publication of information and opinions which might be
inadmissible as evidence,1 the testimony of unsworn witnesses, 2 the sen-
sational and one-sided presentation of material which would be ad-
missible in court,3 and even the extensive reporting of the bare facts of
a criminal incident. 4 No empirical studies, however, have been made to
identify the forms of crime coverage most likely to result in prejudice
or describe the kinds of criminal proceedings most affected by extensive
publicity. The problem posed by crime coverage is almost universally
acknowledged, but the focus of recent inquiry has been directed less to
the nature of the problem than to the search for appropriate solutions.5
This comment will review several measures designed to immunize
criminal proceedings from the prejudicial effects of publicity and sug-
gest a system based on automatic relief to defendants as the appropriate
next step in limiting the prejudicial effects of extensive coverage of
crimes.
1 Courts have usually limited their definition of "prejudicial publicity" to the pub-
lication of inadmissible material. E.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Marshall V.
United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959). Commentators generally recognize such material to be
an important, but not the only, source of publicity prejudice. See generally FELsHER &
ROSEN, THsE PREsS IN THE JURY Box 35-51 (1966); McCarthy, Fair Trial and Prejudicial
Publicity: A Need for Reform, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 79 (1965); Comment, Fair Trial v. Free
Press, 38 So. CAL. L. Rav. 672 (1965).
2 See Sheppard v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 52 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring). See generally
Goldfarb, Public Information, Criminal Trials and the Cause Celebre, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rav.
810 (1961); C. Jaffe, The Press and the Oppressed-A Study of Prejudicial News Reporting
in Criminal Cases (pts. 1-2), 56 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 1, 158 (1965).
3 Comment, Controlling Press and Radio Influence on Trials, 63 HARv. L. Rv. 840, 841
(1950); see Comment, supra note 1, 38 So. CAL. L. REv. at 681.
4 F zSHER & ROSEN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 174-87 (effects upon public opinion of a
typical style of extensive crime reporting).
5 E.g., Goldfarb, supra note 2; C. Jaffe, supra note 2; L. Jaffe, Trial by Newspaper, 40
N.Y.U.L. Rav. 504 (1965).
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I. PRESENT TREATMENT OF THE PROBLEM
It is frequently asserted that "the best answer to the crime coverage
problem would be the answer of self-discipline."'6 The police and the
organized bar could prohibit their members from releasing information
which might be prejudicial if publicized, and voluntary restraints by
the press would solve the problem. However, although a number of
voluntary codes have been drafted and several adopted, 7 very few have
been observed with any consistency. Voluntary restraint has failed in
the big cities.8 Thus, the task of dealing with the effects of crime cover-
age has been left to the courts, which have tried to cope with the prob-
lem in several ways: by instructing jurors to disregard what they have
heard and read before trial and to avoid future contact with material
related to the case; by examining prospective jurors about their knowl-
edge of the case and dismissing them when the danger of prejudice is
demonstrated; by granting the defendant trial level relief such as a
continuance or change of venue; and by reversing convictions where
extensive publicity has prejudiced the defendant.
Trial judges commonly instruct the jury to disregard all that they
have heard about the case outside the courtroom,9 but experienced trial
lawyers suggest that such instructions are self-defeating,10 and serve only
to call a jury's attention to extraneous material. Moreover, there is
general agreement that cautionary instructions are totally inadequate
to cope with the problems posed by extensive crime coverage."
Prospective jurors may be examined by the court, and in most states
by counsel, about their knowledge of the case and the effect of this
knowledge on their impartiality. Where it appears that a member of
6 Testimony of Professor Philip B. Kurland before the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights and Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Committee on the Judiciary, on
S. 290, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
7 E.g., Canon 20, Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association; Massachusetts
Guide for the Bar and News Media; Oregon Bar-Press-Broadcasters Joint Statement of
Principles, reprinted in CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMocRATIC INSTITUTIONs, FREE TRIAL vs.
A FREE PRass 34-87 (1965). These "guides" range from the very general (Oregon) to the
fairly specific (Massachusetts).
8 The Massachusetts Guide was adopted by 26 daily and 81 weekly papers in the state
but has failed dismally in Boston, where none of the big dailies except the Christian
Science Monitor adheres to it. In New York, the Times is reputed to have adopted
voluntary restraints, but the other daily papers have not. The Washington Post also follows
a unilateral publicity policy but the other Washington dailies have not conspicuously
restricted their coverage.
9 See cases collected in 28A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1186 (1961).
10 Justice Jackson has stated: "The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be
overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated
fiction." Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (concurring opinion).
11 See, e.g., C. Jaffe, supra note 2, at 12; Goldfarb, supra note 2, at 822.
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the panel will not be impartial, he may be excused for cause.12 How-
ever, a recently published study of civil jury cases' 3 reports that voir
dire is ineffective in weeding out unfavorable jurors by eliciting in-
formation which would bear on a juror's predispositions. 14 It would
seem that many of the weaknesses in civil voir dire are to be found in
the questioning of jurors in criminal cases.' 5 But even if voir dire were-
a more reliable procedure, the present standards for dismissing jurors.
for cause make voir dire a weak countermeasure against jury prejudice.
Jurors who know something about the cases are not necessarily ex-
cluded, and even those who express a "tentative opinion" about the
defendant's guilt may be retained if they testify that they are capable
of giving the accused a fair hearing.16 Since genuine impartiality is un-
likely when individuals have formed impressions from publicity,17 once-
a well-publicized defendant has exhausted his limited peremptory chal-
lenges, voir dire and challenge for cause would appear to afford insuffi-
cient protection against the effects of publicity.'8
Trial courts presently have three discretionary remedies at their dis-
posal to protect the defendant from having his case tried at an inappro-
priate time or place: change of venue, continuance, and declaration of
a mistrial. A change of venue transfers the case to another part of the
jurisdiction, away from the influence of local publicity and strong feel-
ings in the community where the crime occurred.19 A continuance post-
12 See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
13 Broeder, Voir Dire Examinations: An Empirical Study, 38 So. CAL. L. REV. 503 (1965).
The data were part of the findings of the University of Chicago Jury Project. Additional
findings of the study are presented in ZEISEL & KALVEN, THE AMERICAN JUvY (to be pub-
lished in 1966), and in SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY (to be published
in 1966).
14 Broeder, supra note 13, at 505. A number of factors contributed to the ineffectiveness.
of the voir dire: judges were hostile to lengthy examinations, questions were avoided
which might have offended potential jurors, and in many cases jurors consciously con-
cealed facts and exhibited a general lack of candor in their answers. Id. at 505-06. It has.
also been suggested that examination of the jury is self-defeating in a publicized case,
because in order to ask prospective jurors whether they have been exposed to particular
information, counsel must come very close to telling the jury precisely that information.
Goldfarb, supra note 2, at 821.
15 While it is probable that judicial hostility to lengthy examinations would not be
important in criminal cases, the other factors mentioned in note 14 seem to apply equally
in civil and criminal cases.
16 See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Bearden v. United States, 304 F.2d 532 (5th
Cir. 1962).
17 See KRECH &- CRUTCHFIELD, THEORY AND PROBLEMS Or SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 86-87 (1948).
If the initial impact of pretrial publicity is as great as is supposed, even sequestration of
the jury becomes an empty gesture where jurors have been exposed to large amounts of
publicity.
18 C. Jaffe, supra note 2, at 12.
19 See Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1914); People v. McKay, 37 Cal. 2d 792, 236
P.2d 145 (1951); People v. Sleezer, 9 Ill. 2d 57, 136 N.E.2d 808 (1956).
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pones the trial and provides a period during which the effects of pub-
licity can subside.20 The declaration of a mistrial nullifies a trial in
progress and makes possible the continuance or transfer of the case.
Empirical data are not available upon which to base generalizations
about trial court standards for granting relief on the ground of prejudi-
cial publicity. It has been said that "trial courts are extremely reluctant
to grant changes of venue,"21 and several notorious denials of trial level
relief are to be found in the case law on publicity prejudice.22 Thus,
a principal criticism of the available trial level remedies has been that
they are seldom utilized.23 A possible explanation is that the judge's
decision to grant relief implies that the defendant cannot receive a fair
trial in his court, and it is natural for judges to have confidence in their
own ability to assure fair trials. Furthermore, since little is known
about the effects of crime coverage on trials, the judge is generally with-
out a standard to evaluate a defendant's motion.2 4 A second criticism of
the present system is that because the granting of relief is almost wholly
within the trial court's discretion, different defendants receive different
treatment even within the same jurisdiction. For these reasons, it is
generally agreed that the present utilization of trial level remedies is
insufficient to cope with the problems posed by extensive crime
coverage.
25
A victim of publicity who is not granted trial level relief may ap-
peal his conviction on the ground that the refusal of such relief denied
him a fair trial. Such appeals will succeed where the defendant can
show either that publicity about his case resulted in "actual prejudice"
by exposing the jury to damaging material which would not have been
admissible as evidence against the accused or that publicity probably so
influenced the community where the accused was tried that a fair trial
could not have taken place.26
20 See Thompson, The Law Relating to Prejudicial News Reporting in Criminal Cases,
in CONFERENCE ON PREJunIcIAL NEws REPORTING IN CRIMINAL CASES 7, 14-15 (Inbau &
Botter eds. 1964).
21 Id. at 13.
22 See, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 346 F.2d 707 (6th
Cir.), cert. granted, 86 Sup. Ct. 289 (1965); Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1959).
23 INBAU & SOWLE, CASES ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1092 (2d ed. 1964); Will, Free Press v.
Fair Trial, 12 DE PAUL L. REV. 197, 209 (1963).
24 Cf. Thompson, supra note 20, at 13. There are a few objective standards of limited
application to aid the judge: television coverage of court proceedings seems to be pro-
hibited by Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). But see id. at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Jurors who admit to a definite bias are excused for cause and trials must be continued
or transferred when it is impossible to find a full panel of jurors willing to state that they
will give the defendant a fair trial. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
25 Goldfarb, supra note 2, at 818-24; C. Jaffe, supra note 2, at 17; L. Jaffe, supra note 5,
at 517-19.
26 Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (probable prejudice); Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717 (1961) (actual prejudice).
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Under the first test, a defendant must show that crime coverage ex-
posed jurors to inadmissible material either before or during the trial.27
If the exposure took place before the trial, the appellate court will usu-
ally place great weight on the examination of jurors in determining
whether the defendant was prejudiced.28 If the inadmissible material
was published after the trial began, the key questions are whether any
members of the jury actually read it and if so, whether this might have
affected the impartiality of the jury.29 The difficulty of proving actual
prejudice means that this standard will afford relief to few injured
defendants.
Two recent Supreme Court decisions adopting the second test dis-
pensed with the usual requirement that the defendant demonstrate
"actual prejudice" and held that convictions should be reversed where
the circumstances justify a presumption of prejudice from publicity.
Rideau v. Louisiana0 reversed a conviction where the defendant's con-
fession was repeatedly televised prior to trial, and Estes v. Texas3' ex-
tended this principle to prohibit the televising of the trial itself. The
new rule of Rideau and Estes holds out more promise of relief for
publicized defendants, but standards for applying the rule remain to
be devised. The failure to devise clear standards also means that those
newspapers concerned with the prompt conviction of criminals will
probably not be deterred from publishing news items before and
during criminal trials by the possibility that this will cause convictions
to be reversed. Were the courts to set up clear prohibitions or guide-
lines for reversal of publicity cases, such as a flat prohibition of televis-
ing trial proceedings, the certainty of reversal where such rules were vio-
lated might cause the mass media to refrain from publishing objection-
able material. But it is unlikely that many forms of potentially danger-
ous publicity could ever be categorized in terms of clear rules where
constitutional standards of fair trial are the basis for classification.3 2
27 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (before trial); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S.
310 (1958) (during trial); United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1963)
(before trial).
28 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1963).
29 Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1958); cf. Janko v. United States, 281 F.2d
156 (8th Cir. 1960), rev'd per curiam, 366 U.S. 716 (1961).
30 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
31 381 U.S. 532 (1965). But see id. at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring).
32 Some types of crime coverage are susceptible of precise categorization which could
be used by courts in applying constitutional doctrine. The courts could, for example,
conclude that any time a defendant's criminal record or the incriminating results of a
"lie detector" test have been publicized, the prejudicial effect of such publicity renders
the denial of trial level relief a deprivation of a defendant's constitutional right to a fair
trial. However, the prejudice resulting from publication of other matters may depend on
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Finally, relying on reversal as the sole answer to the problems posed
by crime coverage involves a great cost to the defendant and the com-
munity. By the time a criminal conviction is reviewed, society has
already borne the expense of, and has subjected the defendant to the
ordeal of, a public trial. A solution should be sought which avoids
useless trials.
II. RECENT PROPOSALS
The recognition that present remedies are not adequately forestall-
ing the threat of prejudicial publicity has produced a number of pro-
posals, four of which have received considerable attention: the Attorney
General's directive limiting the release of information by Justice De-
partment personnel,33 Senator Morse's bill which would punish the
divulgence of information relating to pending criminal litigation in
the federal courts, 3 4 the proposed Massachusetts statute which would
regulate the release and publication of information about pending
criminal trials,35 and Professor Jaffe's recommendation to regulate pub-
lication of information related to pending criminal trials.3 6 Each of
these proposals has certain shortcomings which the approach suggested
in this comment attempts to overcome.
The Attorney General's Directive
On April 16, 1965, the Attorney General issued a directive to Justice
Department employees setting out guidelines for the release of informa-
tion relating to criminal proceedings. It advised against the release of
five kinds of information:
(i) Observations about a defendant's character.
(ii) Statements, admissions, confessions, or alibis attribut-
able to a defendant.
(iii) References to investigative procedures, such as finger-
prints, polygraph examinations, ballistic tests, or labora-
tory tests.
the circumstances of a particular case. This is probably true with disclosures regarding
the circumstances of arrest, the nature of the crime, and the possible involvement of the
defendant in other crimes, as well as with the total amount of crime coverage in all forms.
It is therefore not surprising that appellate courts are unwilling to upset criminal con-
victions and repudiate a trial court's exercise of discretion except where the effect of
publicity is extreme.
33 Release of Information by Personnel of the Department of Justice Relating to
Criminal Proceedings, 28 C.F.R. § 50.2 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Directive].
34 S. 290, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
36 Mass. H.B. 3991 (1965). This bill has been tabled pending the results of a study
authorized by the legislature on October 5, 1965. See Mass. Acts 9- Resolves of 1965, ch.
119, at 42-43.
36 L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 523-24.
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(iv) Statements concerning the identity, credibility, or tes-
timony of prospective witnesses.
(v) Statements concerning evidence or argument in the
case, whether or not it is anticipated that such evidence
or argument will be used at trialY7
The directive further advised against the encouragement or assis-
tance of news media "in photographing or televising a defendant or
accused person ... in federal custody. ' 38 These guidelines derive from
the recognition that release of this kind of information can "create
dangers of prejudice without serving a significant law enforcement
function." 39 But the directive is, at best, a partial answer to the prob-
lems attributable to extensive crime coverage. It applies only to Justice
Department employees; where local authorities participate in investiga-
tions, they are free to provide the press with the prohibited types of
information. The directive does not apply to the release of information
about a suspect who is a fugitive from justice.40 Further, it is expressly
subordinate to the discretion of the responsible Justice Department
representative on the scene.41 More importantly, such a policy cannot
regulate the flow of prejudicial information to the mass media. Even
if all prosecuting offices were to follow the lead of the Justice Depart-
ment, information could still be obtained from witnesses, public rec-
ords, police, and victims. 42 Because this directive applies only to the
Justice Department and controls only the flow of certain types of pre-
judicial publicity, it may diminish the crime coverage problem but
does not eliminate it.
The Morse Proposal
On January 6, 1965, Senator Wayne Morse introduced a bill "To
protect the integrity of the court and jury functions in [federal] crim-
inal cases." 43 The bill provides:
It shall constitute a contempt of court for any employee of the
United States, or for any defendant or his attorney or the
agent of either, to furnish or make available for publication
37 Directive § 6.
38 Directive § 7.
39 Directive § 6.
40 Directive § 8.
41 Directive § 9.
42 For example, criminal records are "public record." Directive § 4.
43 S. 290, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). The bill is co-sponsored by fifteen senators, and
has been endorsed by the Judicial Conference of the United States. Judicial Conference of
the United States, Report of Proceedings, March 18-19, 1965, p. 21.
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information not already properly filed with the court which
might affect the outcome of any pending criminal litigation,
except evidence that has already been admitted at the trial.44
The bill would punish contempt by a fine not exceeding $1,000. 45
While more comprehensive in coverage than the Attorney General's
directive, the bill attaches no penalties to the publication of crime news
and fails to protect defendants from the publication of witnesses' opin-
ions, criminal records, or details of the alleged crime, or from the
damage which can result from a one-sided presentation of evidence
offered in court. Like the Attorney General's directive and other at-
tempts to control the divulgence of information to the mass media,
the Morse bill does not provide adequate protection against the effects
of crime coverage because it cannot regulate all the sources of preju-
dicial publicity and because it does not afford relief to the accused
when his case has already received excessive publicity.
The Alassachusetts Proposal
A more comprehensive attempt to regulate the release of information
relating to pending criminal cases is the proposed section 39 of chapter
268 of the General Laws of Massachusetts, 40 entitled, "An Act protect-
ing trial by jury from influence by the divulgence, broadcast or publi-
cation of certain information." It provides that:
Any statement or information.. . shall be deemed to be pre-
judicial to a defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial by
jury if it relates (a) that any person has confessed to a crime;
or (b) the contents of any confession or part thereof; or (c)
that any person arrested for having committed a crime has
ever committed, been suspected of, accused of, arrested for,
indicted for [,] convicted of or acquitted of the commission of
any other crime; or (d) transcripts, reports or summaries of
occurrences taking place during the course of proceedings
from which the jury has been excluded by the trial court.47
The proposal provides that no officer of the court shall divulge such
"prejudicial" information to a news disseminating agency and that no
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Mass. H.B. 3991 (1965). A number of commentators have proposed similar broad
regulations patterned after the British use of the contempt power to control crime
coverage. See, e.g., C. Jaffe, The Press and the Oppressed-A Study of Prejudicial News
Reporting in Criminal Cases (11), J. Clmu. L., C. & P.S. 158 (1965); McCarthy, supra note 1,
at 94; Comment, Contempt by Publication, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 531 (1965).
47 Mass. H.B. 3991, § 2 (1965).
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news disseminating agency shall publish or broadcast any statement or
information classified as "prejudicial." 48
One draft of the bill would treat a violation as a contempt of the
court which has trial jurisdiction over the criminal proceedings, with
the proviso that trial by jury be available in prosecutions under the
statute.49 A second draft would make violation a misdemeanor.8 0
The Massachusetts proposal affords much broader protection than
regulations which do not control the publication of crime news. It has
often been suggested that such a program is the only workable alter-
native to the dangers of extensive crime coverage.81 But this proposal,
too, would fail to afford the subject of publicity complete protection
from such potentially prejudicial forms of publicity as the one-sided
presentation of material presented at the trial and saturation coverage
of a criminal trial. In addition, because the proposed statute would
constitute a direct restraint on the liberty to divulge and publish
information and opinions, it may be invalid as a violation of first
amendment freedom of the press. In the twenty-five years since the
present standards were announced for contempt by publication, the
Supreme Court has not upheld a contempt citation punishing publica-
tion. The rule that a publication is punishable by contempt only if it
posed a "clear and present danger" to the integrity of the judicial
process has resulted in the reversal of contempt citations where news-
papers attacked judges.8 2 The Court's recent decision in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,53 reversing a state court libel judgment on first
amendment grounds, strongly indicates that the Supreme Court is not
about to relax the standards which limit the state's right to abridge free
-expression.54
On the other hand, the constitutional limitations on the use of the
contempt power have never been applied to situations involving a
pending jury trial, and the Supreme Court has never passed on a case
48 Mass. H.B. 3991, § 1 (1965).
49 Mass. H.B. 3991, §§ 5, 6 (1965).
50 Mass. H.B. 4201 (1965). Professor Jaffe feels that divorcing the regulation of crime
coverage from the contempt power may make such a proposal less objectionable to the
courts. See L. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 523.
51 See C. Jaffe, supra note 46, at 165.
52 The leading case is Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). See also Wood v.
Georgia, 870 U.S. 575 (1962); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U.S. 331 (1946). In all four cases the Court reversed state court contempt convictions.
53 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
54 Professor Kalven maintains that "the contempt problem is at least a sibling if not a
twin to the one presented in the Times case." Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note
on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," z964 Sutanam CoURT REv. 191, 214.
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where the legislature had explicitly declared particular practices to be
dangerously prejudicial. 55 Thus, within the framework of precedent
the Court could allow some use of criminal penalties to regulate
publicity regarding pending jury trials.56
Whatever the legal status of the Massachusetts approach, to the ex-
tent that regulation of this sort limits free expression, it is to be re-
gretted. The danger exists that it might set a precedent for more
general regulation of free expression. But even if this approach can be
limited to the area of its inception, such restraint undermines the
desirable effect upon the community of some kinds of criminal pub-
licity. As the Scottsboro case indicates,57 an imperfect judicial system
has frequently required the corrective effects of public arousal. Public
pressure can also be a powerful weapon against corruption when the
prosecutor or the police fail to enforce the law.5 8 Furthermore, in
unusual circumstances pretrial publicity can serve to reduce com-
munity anxiety.59 Imposing substantial restraints on publishers would
give insufficient respect to the legitimate public concern with crime
problems.
Finally, the Massachusetts proposal does not reach such potentially
prejudicial coverage as media treatment of the facts of the crime, the
circumstances of arrest, and contemporaneous coverage of the events
and evidence presented at trial.
In sum, the Massachusetts proposal raises a serious constitutional
question and would limit freedom of expression. It would also tend to
reduce the effectiveness of publicity in safeguarding against prosecutor
and police corruption and in alleviating community anxiety. And
because it fails to regulate many forms of crime coverage, it does not
even fully protect the defendant from the threat of prejudice.
55 See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 389 (1962); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940).
56 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered this question and found
itself "unable to predict what might be held in the Supreme Court of the United
States .. " Opinion of the Justices, 208 N.E.2d 240, 244 (Mass. 1965).
57 Nine young Negroes were convicted of rape, a capital offense in Alabama. The case
reached the Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Ultimately, northern
public opinion saved the defendants from the electric chair. See REYNOLDS, COURTROOM 240-
304 (1950).
58 L. Jaffe, Trial by Newspaper, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 504, 512 (1965).
59 For example, if a suspect were to confess to the recent epidemic of Boston stranglings,
the publication of such information would serve this sort of public interest. For a graphic
example of an unsolved crime arousing anxiety in the community where it occurred, see
CAPOTE, IN COLD BLOOD (1966). Unfortunately, publishing information which is most likely
to prejudice an accused (e.g., publication of a confession or an official's belief that the
accused is guilty) seems to be the most effective way to reduce community anxiety.
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The Jaffe Proposal
In a recent article,60 Professor Louis Jaffe recommended a more re-
fined penal regulation of mass media crime coverage. He believes that
laws prohibiting very narrow classes of pretrial publicity and a general
prohibition of publicity during the trial would probably be sustained
by the courts but that general prohibitions of pretrial publicity would
violate present first amendment standards. 61 He therefore proposes:
'(a) that the divulging of information bearing upon the guilt or inno-
cence or character of an accused by attorneys, police, or other public
officials be punishable as contempt of court;62 and (b) "from the be-
ginning of the voir dire until the rendering of the verdict, it should be
made a crime to publish a confession, information bearing upon guilt
-or innocence or upon the character of the accused, unless and until
such matter is admitted into evidence." 63
The limited effect of prohibiting public officials and officers of the
court from divulging information has already been discussed. Thus,
the Jaffe proposal leaves the burden of protecting publicized defen-
dants on the prohibition of certain kinds of crime coverage during the
trial and voir dire. Much depends upon how broadly the clause relating
to material "bearing on guilt.., or character" is interpreted. A broad
interpretation would result in a virtual publicity blackout during trial;
a narrow reading would invite fine distinctions and limited protection.
In either case, it can be said that the Jaffe proposal avoids many of
the objections raised against the Massachusetts proposal.6 4 Its ample
allowance for pre- and post-trial publicity would seem sufficient for the
beneficial functions of crime coverage to operate.65 Whether such regu-
lation would in fact be upheld by the Supreme Court cannot be pre-
dicted, but this limited program would surely be more acceptable than
a general prohibition of crime coverage prior to the rendition of a final
judgment.
This greater acceptability is achieved at a high cost. No provision is
made for relief for victims of publicity; they are, presumably, in no
better position under the Jaffe proposal than under present law once
publication occurs. More importantly, the proposal does not limit pre-
60 L. Jaffe, supra note 58, at 504.
61 Id. at 522.
62 Id. at 523-24.
63 Id. at 524.
64 Professor Jaffe feels that his proposal's acceptability is also enhanced by its substi-
tution of conventional criminal regulation for an extension of the contempt power. Id.
at 523.
65 Id. at 512.
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trial publicity, but trusts the present voir dire system to provide com-
prehensive protection against the effects of pretrial publicity upon
potential jurors. Yet it has been suggested that voir dire is an ineffective
screening mechanism and that the present standards of juror challenge
do not protect an accused from the prejudicial effects of crime
coverage.66
Thus, the Jaffe proposal is but another partial solution to the crime
coverage problem. Whether such partial protection justifies the impo-
sition of criminal sanctions on the press is a question best postponed
until more is known about the magnitude of the publicity problem in
America.
III. A NEW APPROACH: AUTOMATIC DEFENDANT-CENTERED REMEDIES
Assuming that something must be done to control the impact of
crime coverage on criminal trials and that an alternative to direct press
censorship should be sought to avoid infringing on the freedom to
publish, an appropriate first step in the development of a comprehen-
sive policy might lie in the establishment of automatic standards for
granting trial level relief to the publicized defendant. The defendant-
centered remedies previously discussed-the challenging of jurors for
cause and the granting of motions for change of venue, continuance,
and new trial-were found to be inadequate at present because they
are seldom used and because of the uncertainty and inconsistency in-
volved whenever protection depends on trial court discretion. These
weaknesses indicate that the present system fails to protect publicity
victims and does not deter the mass media from excessively publicizing
criminal cases.
The above shortcomings are not inherent in a system of defendant-
centered remedies. A statute or judge-made rule could set out the
conditions upon which a defendant would be entitled to trial level
relief as a matter of right.67 At the same time, the standards of juror
66 See discussion accompanying notes 13-18 supra.
67 Rules 18 and 21 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure would seem to confer
upon federal district courts the power to implement this kind of policy. See Rule 6 of
the Rules of the United States District Court for the District of Oregon (1964) for a
local court rule governing the place of trial. The United States Supreme Court could
establish automatic standards for federal courts by rule with the approval of Congress and
probably without congressional mandate by judicial decision. The inherent rule-making
power of the state courts would support the establishment of such a policy by supreme
courts or conferences of trial level judges unless the automatic policy conflicted with
existing statutes. Rule-of-court policy would evidently be allowed, for example, in Cali-
fornia. See People v. Walker, 76 Cal. App. 192, 244 Pac. 94 (1926); cases collected at 13
CAL. JUR. 2D Courts § 169 (1954).
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challenge could be liberalized in cases involving extensive crime cover-
age.68 Such a rule could specify that when publicity is extensive but
insufficient for mandatory relief, requests for relief should be granted
when this would not involve substantial costs in terms of time, money,
and convenience. If the kind or amount of publicity exceeded the
threshold before the date of trial, a change of venue, extended con-
tinuance, or both, would be granted as a matter of right. If the
threshold were exceeded during the trial, a mistrial would be granted
68 A more liberal standard for challenging jurors on the basis of prejudice would apply
to all criminal cases. But suggested alternatives to the present rules, such as excusing
potential jurors who have formed tentative opinions or excusing all jurors who have read
or heard about the case, would normally affect only those criminal cases involving sub-
stantial publicity. Whether it is preferable to exclude all potential jurors who have heard
about the case or only those who express "tentative opinions" depends on one's view of
the efficacy of voir dire and on the possibility of finding totally uninformed juries in well
publicized cases. To the extent that voir dire is considered unreliable, the broader exclusion
is to be preferred. This would seem to be the implication in Broeder, Voir Dire Examina-
tions: An Empirical Study, 38 So. CAL. L. REv. 503 (1965). However, little would be gained
by promulgating a jury standard so strict that in some cases no jury could be impaneled.
Therefore, while present standards are in need of reform, much empirical research is
needed to determine the extent to which a reform of the standards for juror challenge is
practical. In theory, a standard that allowed challenge of any juror who admitted knowl-
edge of a particular case could be a complete remedy to the crime coverage problem. Such
a program, however, would impanel only the ill-informed or untruthful juror, and might
do more harm than good.
Another suggested reform is the selection of jurors on the basis of intelligence and
educational background or "a psychological test designed to gauge the individual's re-
sistance to propaganda." Comment, The Impartial jury-Twentieth Century Dilemma:
Some Solutions to the Conflict Between Free Press and Fair Trial, 51 Coanau.. L.Q. 306,
326 (1966). However, there is insufficient correlation between intelligence and education
and the tendency to be affected by publicity to justify reliance on such standards as a
sufficient guard against prejudice. See ibid.
A psychological test based on a propaganda scale would be inadequate. First, tests would
not measure the extent to which each individual was actually exposed to publicity about
the case, but would leave this task to the untrustworthy voir dire procedure. Present
standards which allow individuals with tentative opinions to sit on the jury, and thus
jeopardize the publicized defendant, would remain unchanged. Second, such tests would
measure only the effects that presenting material in different forms will have upon in-
dividuals; they cannot measure the impact information will have on individuals irrespec-
tive of its source or format. Convincing evidence pointing to a defendant's guilt which
may be the subject of publicity, such as inadmissible real evidence, confessions obtained
in violation of strict constitutional standards, the previous criminal record of the accused,
and the testimony of witnesses unavailable to testify at the trial, will influence individuals'
opinions independently of the variable tested by the propaganda scale. Thus, the danger
of prejudice would remain even if such tests predicted perfectly the traits they were de-
signed to measure.
Also, under this scheme the jury would still be exposed to extensive publicity even if
they were not as profoundly affected by some of it as their peers would be, and nothing
would be done to offset the effect upon judges and juries of pressures from a community
aroused by publicity.
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as of right and appropriate venue and time adjustments would be made
respecting the new trial.6 9 A refusal to grant the relief specified by the
rule would constitute reversible error.
The greatest difficulty with this approach involves establishing the
standards for automatic relief. The paucity of empirical data on the
effects of publicity renders any judgment arbitrary. Modest research,
such as a study of the amount of crime coverage in metropolitan news-
papers and the number of cases accorded different amounts of pub-
licity during a given period, would be valuable.70 In the absence of
such information, it is suggested that the standards for automatic relief
should have both a qualitative and a quantitative dimension. Qualita-
tive standards would deal with those kinds of publicity which may
pose a special threat to fair trials, such as information which is generally
excluded from criminal litigation. The statute or court rule would set
out the specific kinds of information which when publicized would
qualify a defendant for automatic relief, regardless of the extent of
coverage they received. Previous criminal records, confessions, and evi-
dence of the defendant's bad reputation would certainly be included in
the qualitative standard.71 Other kinds of material, such as editorial
69 In the case of pretrial publicity a defendant who did not timely request appropriate
relief and could not show a good reason for his failure to do so would presumably be held
to have waived the relief to which he would otherwise be entitled.
70 Reliable information about the number of cases that involve extensive publicity
would also yield vital information about the relative cost of publicity remedies. The
primary cost of defendant-centered remedies would be the extra time and money society
must invest in each case that would be affected by the policy. The total cost of such relief
would depend on the number of cases affected: if the number of extensive publicity cases
is small, the cost of defendant-centered remedies will be correspondingly small and the
legal system will be able to afford a generous attitude toward publicized defendants.
The primary cost of proposals that call for restrictions on the press and on the public
right to information is the loss of the freedom to publish. The nature of this restraint is
much more important in determining its cost than the number of times restraint would
have to be employed. Thus, a finding that relatively few cases are involved would weigh
in favor of the defendant-centered solution; by the same token, a finding that the number
of cases affected is very large would tend to favor the adoption of restraints.
71 Certain kinds of evidence which are usually excluded from criminal trials may be
admitted in special situations. Evidence of prior criminal convictions, for example, is
excluded when offered to prove the defendant's criminal disposition, but is admitted when
it bears on the defendant's motive. See, e.g., Fuller v. State, 269 Ala. 312, 334-37, 113 So. 2d
153, 172-76 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 936 (1960). In a situation of this kind, pretrial
publication of such material should qualify a defendant for automatic relief even if the
evidence might have been admitted at his trial. This approach should be employed
where the general policy excluding such evidence is based on its prejudicial effect, because
only such a rule can give the media clear warning about the effect of publishing informa-
tion in this category, and because allowing publication would expose the defendant to
the prejudicial effect of such evidence without the benefit of a limiting instruction and a
court's admonition to reject the prejudicial inference.
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comment on the case, opinions of prospective witnesses, and extended
official comments, could be also included.7 2
Quantitative standards could be based on the amount of publicity
concerning a particular case or the impact of that publicity on com-
munity opinion. A given amount of publicity, such as five hundred
column inches of newspaper coverage in the twelve months before
trial, would automatically entitle a defendant to pretrial relief. An
adaptation of this general policy to less populous areas would utilize a
percentage, as opposed to an absolute amount, of total newspaper
coverage devoted to one criminal case over a given period of time.
This would compensate for the lesser number of newspaper pages
printed in such areas. Newspaper coverage would be used as a measure-
ment because it is readily quantified and it probably reflects coverage
in the other media.7 3
Setting an arbitrary level of publicity as the standard need not im-
pose a hardship on those defendants who do not qualify for automatic
relief. The more liberal discretionary relief called for by the policy
embodied in the new statute, court rule, or decision, coupled with au-
tomatic relief when certain kinds of material are published without re-
72 For a proposal which would lead to automatic relief when editorial comment is
directed at an accused, see Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae,
p. 27, Sheppard v. Maxwell, cert. granted, 86 Sup. Ct. 289 (1965).
73 The amount of coverage which qualifies a defendant for quantitative relief would
be set arbitrarily at the start. No information available suggests the quantity of press
coverage-fifty, or five hundred column inches-with which a substantial danger of preju-
dice is associated. Initially, the threshold would be very high (e.g., 500 column inches) and
would afford protection only in extreme cases. The danger of publicity prejudice would
seem substantial in cases which receive 500 column inches of newspaper coverage, the
equivalent of twelve one-half page stories in a large city newspaper with the format of
the Chicago Sun-Times. Coverage so extensive is a response to community interest that
editors must think already exists as well as a powerful means of increasing interest and
influencing attitudes. Also, when newspapers in a community have covered a story this
thoroughly, competition will normally impel other media to add to the exposure of a case.
Setting the cutoff point this high in no way suggests that less extensive publicity may
not involve the same danger of an unfair trial. The qualitative standards and quantitative
standards based on public opinion polls will afford protection to many of these defendants.
Because of this supplemental protection, and because some threshold must initially be set,
it should be set at a level of publicity sufficiently high that a prejudicial impact can be
presumed to exist. However, after the policy has been in effect for a time the sufficiency
of the protection afforded by the original standard could be evaluated in terms of the
number of cases in which public opinion poll data suggest that prejudice exists. If many
such cases were those in which the amount of publicity was insufficient for automatic pro-
tection, the threshold would be lowered.
Because the quantitative standard would give some additional protection to publicized
defendants yet would involve remedies already within the judge's discretion, the arbitrary
figure selected initially would not be palpably objectionable. But a recognition that such a
threshold is without an empirical foundation should encourage liberal discretionary relief
and a readiness to change the standard whenever this appears appropriate.
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gard to quantity, represent a significant improvement over a defendant's
present plight. Further protection might come from the application of
a second quantitative standard: at the direction of thV court, modest
public opinion polls could provide a supplementary criterion for grant-
ing relief. When polls revealed that more than a set percentage of the
local population sample expressed belief in the defendant's guilt, relief
would issue automatically. Once techniques and samples for a locality
were established, such polls would not involve great expense, and they
would constitute an adequate foundation for defendant-centered
remedies which would not involve great sacrifices of other values such
as judicial economy or freedom of the press.7 4
A general policy of defendant-centered remedies would be expected
to have both corrective and preventive effects on criminal publicity.
Corrective effects are the more obvious product: change of venue will
usually remove the defendant from the area where the public has been
exposed to extensive publicity; continuance will permit publicity
effects to recede; liberalized challenge rules will help detect and remove
prejudice; new trials will guard against convictions based on prejudice.
The automatic policy might also exert a preventive influence on
crime coverage. First, clear standards will give the media objective
criteria for pre-judging how much and what kinds of coverage are
considered objectionable. Voluntary codes have failed to provide such
a standard because they are often impossibly vague and because they
carry no weight as official standards.7 5 Clear standards, by making com-
pliance easy and permitting limited forms of coverage, will encourage
the cooperative response of the mass media. Second, the fact that pub-
lication of material included in the automatic policy will result in the
certain delay of criminal justice might motivate professional organi-
zations and police to develop crime coverage policies of their own. Bar
74 An adequate telephone survey for the Chicago area would cost between two and
three hundred dollars, representing seventy hours of telephone work for a 500 person
survey. Interview with David Segal, National Opinion Research Center, Chicago, Illinois,
Oct. 22, 1965. Such a survey would almost certainly be accurate enough to serve as the
basis of pretrial procedural relief to a defendant. For example, if a 500 person random
survey indicated that 20 per cent of the sample population expressed some belief in the
defendant's guilt, 19 times out of 20 this would indicate that between 16 per cent and 24
per cent of the sampled population had this belief. See PARTEN, SURVEYS, POLLS, AND
SAMPLES 307-30 (1950). This kind of "approximation" seems entirely sufficient for the
purposes which opinion polling would serve under an automatic system. A public opinion
poll conducted to determine whether relief should be granted in a specific case would
probably ask whether individuals had heard of the accused in relation to the crime and
whether they had formed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused.
75 For example, the Oregon Bar-Press Statement of Principles says nothing more specific
than "good taste should prevail in the selection, printing and broadcasting of the news"
and "no person's reputation should be injured needlessly."
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associations faced with the systematic delay of trials might punish
attorneys who disclose information which would violate the qualitative
standards in force in their jurisdiction. In addition, attorneys could be
encouraged to use the information they are permitted to release to the
press as a lever, requiring in exchange for such information that re-
porters promise that newspaper coverage will not be such as to trigger
automatic relief. This would provide an incentive of preferential
treatment to those newspapers and radio and television stations which
cooperate with the policy. The police administration, greatly interested
in swift convictions, could implement a similar policy.
A third factor tending to limit crime coverage under an automatic
policy is the implicit threat that if such a policy fails the next logical
step is the direct regulation of crime coverage and the resort to criminal
penalties for violation. While the policy is designed as a sincere effort
to avoid direct regulation, it will serve as a warning that continued
abuse will invite a more punitive official publicity policy. Thus,
although the defendant-centered system may ultimately present the
media with the choice between voluntary and compulsory restraints,
it does so without any measure of direct control over freedom of
expression.
Finally, it has been suggested that the media themselves have an
interest in quick and certain criminal convictions.76 While it is doubt-
ful that this factor would have a significant effect on crime coverage if
no other negative consequences attached to extensive crime coverage,
such a concern might add to the cumulative effect of the other sanc-
tions of the automatic policy.
There are, however, several objections to such a policy which should
be noted. It has been argued that publicity effects are so pervasive that
changing the county of trial or postponing trial for six months or a year
would not suffice to eradicate the prejudice caused by publicity.7 7 This
proposition is usually based on such extraordinary situations as the
Ruby murder case in Dallas and the Sheppard case in Cleveland.78
But most cases are heavily publicized in relatively circumscribed geo-
graphical areas; the regional or national cause celebre is a relative
rarity. Even those cases that become widely known are much more
thoroughly exposed close to home: the publicity in the Sheppard case,
76 L. Jaffe, supra note 58, at 522.
77 See C. Jaffe, The Press and the Oppressed-A Study of Prejudicial News Reporting
in Criminal Cases, 56 J. CRnm. L., . & P.S. 1, 11 (1965).
78 The appeal in the Sheppard case is reported in State v. Sheppard, 165 Ohio St. 293,
135 N.E.2d 340 (1956). Regarding the Oswald-Ruby publicity, see KAPLAN & WALTZ, THE
TRIAL OF JACK Ruay 37, 69-90 (1965).
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for example, seems to have been both more intensive and more sensa-
tional in Cleveland than it was in distant Ohio communities."9 For
this reason, and because the prejudicial effects of publicity diminish
with time,80 defendant-centered relief is a step in the right direction
even in the ususual case. Liberalizing the rules for challenging jurors
for cause with respect to publicity would further assist the nationally
publicized defendant. Despite these safeguards, a particular defendant
might need still further protection; it might even be impossible to
afford him a trial by a jury which has not been substantially informed
about his case prior to trial. But the rare problem which may be in-
capable of solution does not diminish the acceptability of this approach
in the vast majority of cases, in which it would work effectively.
A second argument against automatic defendant-centered remedies
is that they are costly. Change of venue is expensive, notably because
of the increased cost of summoning and transporting witnesses and
counsel. Continuance represents a cost in terms of time, efficiency, and
the decreased likelihood of obtaining the best testimony of witnesses
in open court.81 But such a policy would also involve certain savings
by avoiding the cost of many of the reversals and new trials which the
present system produces as well as the expense involved in impaneling
an impartial jury in a community which has been exposed to extensive
criminal publicity. The total cost would depend on the threshold
selected to trigger automatic relief and upon the number of cases which
were extensively publicized.
IV. CONCLUSION
The present substantive framework for handling criminal publicity
problems is inappropriate to the formulation of a workable general
policy. Attempts to limit the divulgence of information about pending
criminal litigation by attorneys and government employees can be
helpful but are probably insufficient because they fail to protect the
accused from a number of forms of potentially prejudicial publicity.
On the other hand, regulating directly the publication of crime news
by imposing criminal sanctions affords more protection to the accused,
79 See the exhibits used by the court in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 346 F.2d 717 (6th Cir.
1965), which came from Cleveland newspapers.
80 Note, Controlling Press and Radio Influence on Trials, 63 HARv. L. REv. 840, 843
(1950) (effects of propaganda diminish over time); see also Levine & Murphy, The Learning
and Forgetting of Controversial Material, 38 J. ABNORMAL & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 507 (1943).
81 Thompson, The Law Relating to Prejudicial News Reporting in Criminal Cases, in
CONFERENCE ON PREJUDICIAL NEWS REPORTING IN CRIMINAL CASES 15 (Inbau & Botter eds.
1964).
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but at a great cost; and even these programs fail to provide complete
protection to the publicized defendant.
A statute or court policy defining situations where defendant-cen-
tered relief would automatically be granted would not directly restrain
the mass media and could give defendants direct protection from the
effects of crime coverage. Additionally, such a policy might reduce
prejudicial crime coverage by establishing clear official standards of
publicity prejudice, which might lead to self-regulation by the police
and members of the bar and would carry the implicit threat of more
stringent regulation to the point where the media would hesitate before
publishing objectionable material. The hypothesis that government re-
straint of free expression should be used only as a last resort suggests
that this defendant-centered program is the appropriate first step in a
general policy aimed at assuring every defendant a fair trial.
